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A model linking macroeconomic equilibrium and income distribution in
balanced growth equilibria is developed as a variant to the Kaldor model of
factor shares. It departs from the original Kaldor model in assuming equal
saving rates and production determined by a matching process between
workers and jobs. Macroeconomic equilibrium (national savings equal to
investment) combines with competitive microeconomic behavior to deter-
mine the real wage and real interest rate. An increase in the ratio of national
debt to employment reduces the real wage, explaining recent declines.
1. Introduction
Two of Jan Tinbergen’s major concerns were the formation of optimal economic
policy and the distribution of income, demonstrated in two of his major pub-
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responsibility of the author.lications (1966, 1975). However, Tinbergen did not pursue these two concerns
separately. In his consideration of economic policy, he explicitly incorporated the
real wage rate as a target:
With the further generalisation of state responsibility t o t a lr e a le x -
penditure x of the nation, supplemented by some measure of income
distribution may be among the targets. The simplest expression of this
distribution may be the ratio Λ between wages L and total national
income Y, or in other cases the ratio λ between the wage rate l and
the price level p. (1966, pp. 8-9)
Tinbergen’s concern with the distributional eﬀects of macroeconomic policy is
not reﬂected in modern treatments of macroeconomics. Perhaps because of "apri-
oristic policy" (1966, p. 3), economists may not believe that macroeconomic poli-
cies can aﬀect real wage rates. This could be true if a ﬁrst-best general equilibrium
prevails in which policies have no net distorionary eﬀects. But in a second-best
solution generated by distortionary taxes and borrowing, policies would aﬀect the
real wage rate.
T i n b e r g e n ’ si n c l u s i o no ft h er e a lw a g er a t ea sat a r g e tv a r i a b l ei sj u s t i ﬁed by
recent experience. The U.S. economy in past decades has exhibited a substantial
decline in the real wage relative to productivity and large changes in the real in-
terest rate over long periods. This paper develops a model linking macroeconomic
variables to factor prices and income distribution. Macroeconomic equilibrium
(Aggregate Demand equal to Aggregate Supply, or national savings equal to in-
vestment) determines a relationship between the real interest rate and the ratio
of unemployed to vacancies. Microeconomic equilibrium, arising from competitive
determination of factor prices, determines a second relationship between the two
variables. Together, macroeconomic and microeconomic equilibrium determine
the real interest rate, the ratio of unemployed to vacancies, and the real wage rate
in balanced growth.
The model developed is a variant of Nicholas Kaldor’s Keynesian model of
income distribution (1955-1956, 1957), in which equality between savings and in-
vestment is brought about by shifts between proﬁt and labor income instead of by
ﬂuctuations in economic activity.1 In Kaldor’s approach, income distribution is
partly explained by macroeconomic phenomena, and shifts of factor incomes are
1See discussions of Kaldor’s model in G. Bertola (2000, pp. 400-498), C.E. Ferguson (1969,
pp. 314-322), Luigi Pasinetti (1962), Kurt Rothschild (1993, Chapters 17-19), Sattinger (2001,
pp. liii-liv), Peter Skott (1989a, 1989b), and James Tobin (1989). Kaldor’s model is one of
2necessary to bring about macroeconomic equilibrium. The model developed here
shares with Kaldor’s model the involvement of income distribution with macro-
economics and the simultaneous explanation of both distributional and macroeco-
nomic phenomena. However, the mechanism linking macroeconomic equilibrium
and income distribution is diﬀerent. In Kaldor’s model, full employment is as-
sumed and an aggregate investment rate is determined exogenously by balanced
growth parameters. With a greater saving rate out of proﬁts, income shifts be-
tween proﬁts and labor income are brought about by changes in prices relative
to wage rates until the aggregate saving rate equals the required investment rate.
In contrast, in the model developed here, the level of production is determined
endogenously, and the saving rate is assumed to be the same for all sources of
income. All variables are real, so there is no inﬂation to bring about changes in
t h ew a g er a t er e l a t i v et ot h ep r i c el e v e l .I nK a l d o r ’ sm o d e l ,t h e r ei saﬁxed cap-
ital to production ratio so that marginal products of factors are not deﬁned and
play no role in determining factor prices. In the model developed here, marginal
contributions to production from an additional worker, an additional employer,
or additional capital can be deﬁned at the aggregate level. Competitive market
forces operate to determine the real wage and real interest rate consistent with
neoclassical principles.
Table 1 shows interest rate, wage, productivity and debt variables that are
relevant in this paper. The data are for the U.S. in the period 1961 to 1999.
The real interest rate in column 2 is measured by the average interest rate on
U.S. Treasury bonds with maturity over ten years minus inﬂation as measured by
increases in the yearly average Consumer Price Index (CPI-U). The real wage is
measured by average hourly earnings in 1982 dollars for total private employment,
not seasonally adjusted. Productivity is measured by the Major Sector Multifactor
Productivity Index for manufacturing. Column 5 is the real wage from column 3
divided by multifactor productivity in column 4 times 100. Column 6 shows the
ratio of national debt to output, measured by the Congressional Budget Oﬃce as
the ratio of national debt held by the public to Gross Domestic Product. The
series in Column 6 can be regarded as national debt per employed worker, divided
by output per employed worker. It is then national debt per employed worker
controlling for productivity changes. Column 7 shows the saving rate measured in
the National Income and Product Accounts by personal savings as a percentage
of personal income. There are alternative ways of measuring these variables, but
several approaches that involve income distribution in a macroeconomic model (see Bertola,
2000, Sattinger, 1990, and Sydney Weintraub, 1958).
3the major patterns are unlikely to be aﬀected.2
The data show substantial changes in factor prices over long periods of time,
with no indication that they are returning to an earlier equilibrium level. The real
interest rate lies between two and three percent in the ﬁrst half of the 1960’s, falls
below one percent (and often goes negative) from 1973 to 1980, rises to between
ﬁve to eight percent between 1982 and 1987, and falls back to a range of three to
ﬁve percent from 1988 on. As the real interest rate falls, the real wage rises from
below seven in 1961 to levels above eight from 1970 to 1979. Then as the real
interest rate rises from below one percent to a 17 year period above 3 percent,
the real wage falls to a level below 8. These changes are not part of business
cycle models describing ﬂuctuations around a long run equilibrium. The long run
changes in the real interest rate and wage rate could potentially be explained by
the episode of inﬂation in the 1960’s and 1970’s but only by abandoning views that
the eﬀects of inﬂation on factor prices end less than a decade after stabilization of
monetary growth. Productivity also does not explain the long run and substantial
changes. Increases in productivity should raise both the real interest rate and the
real wage. However, the real wage declines relative to multifactor productivity, as
s h o w ni nt h er a t i oi nC o l u m n5 ,f r o m1 9 7 8 on. Use of output per hour instead of
multifactor productivity would result in even steeper declines in the ratio of wages
to productivity. Imperfections in the measurement of productivity cannot be the
explanation for the observed long run behavior of factor prices since real interest
rates and real wages move in opposite directions. Other explanations are possible
(e.g., capital-skill complementarity) and cannot be ruled out by these data.
2See Kreuger, 1999, for discussion of measurement problems.
4Table 1: U.S. Factor Prices and Debt
12 3 4 5 6 7
Year Real r Real Wage Productivity Wage/Productivity Debt/Output Saving Rate
1961 2.90 6.88 68.9 .999 44.9 8.3
1962 2.95 7.07 71.6 .987 43.6 8.3
1963 2.70 7.17 73.6 .974 42.3 7.8
1964 2.85 7.33 75.7 .968 40.0 8.8
1965 2.61 7.52 77.7 .968 37.9 8.6
1966 1.75 7.62 78.0 .977 34.8 8.3
1967 1.75 7.72 77.5 .996 32.8 9.4
1968 1.06 7.89 79.9 .987 33.3 8.4
1969 0.62 7.98 80.5 .991 29.3 7.8
1970 0.88 8.03 79.2 1.014 27.9 9.4
1971 1.34 8.21 81.4 1.009 28.0 10.0
1972 2.43 8.53 84.4 1.011 27.4 8.9
1973 0.10 8.55 85.9 .995 26.0 10.5
1974 -4.02 8.28 81.3 1.018 23.8 10.7
1975 -2.12 8.12 78.9 1.029 25.3 10.6
1976 0.98 8.24 81.7 1.009 27.5 9.4
1977 0.56 8.36 82.9 1.008 27.8 8.7
1978 0.29 8.40 83.6 1.005 27.4 9.0
1979 -2.56 8.17 82.7 .988 25.6 9.2
1980 -2.69 7.78 81.3 .957 26.1 10.2
1981 2.59 7.69 81.9 .939 25.8 10.8
1982 6.03 7.68 83.3 .922 28.6 10.9
1983 7.64 7.79 85.2 .914 33.0 8.8
1984 7.69 7.80 87.8 .888 34.0 10.6
1985 7.15 7.77 89.2 .871 36.4 9.2
1986 6.24 7.81 90.7 .861 39.6 8.2
1987 5.03 7.73 93.5 .827 40.6 7.3
1988 4.88 7.69 95.2 .808 40.9 7.8
1989 3.79 7.64 93.4 .818 40.5 7.5
1990 3.33 7.52 93.3 .806 42.0 7.8
1991 3.96 7.45 92.4 .806 45.4 8.3
1992 4.52 7.41 94.0 .788 48.2 8.7
1993 3.46 7.39 94.9 .779 49.5 7.1
1994 4.81 7.40 97.3 .761 49.4 6.1
1995 4.14 7.39 99.2 .745 49.2 5.6
1996 3.80 7.43 100.0 .743 48.5 4.8
1997 4.37 7.55 103.5 .729 46.0 4.2
1998 4.09 7.75 106.3 .729 42.9 4.7
1999 3.93 7.86 109.4 .718 39.7 2.4
5This paper proposes an explanation based on the link between the macroeco-
nomic sector and microeconomic determination of factor prices. The stylized facts
concerning long run relationships to be addressed by the model developed here are
as follows. Over the period 1961 to 1999, the real interest rate declines, increases
substantially and then declines to a level greater than at the start of the period.
The real wage relative to productivity is roughly inversely related to the real in-
terest rate, rising and then declining. These patterns occur contemporaneously
with a decline in the ratio of national debt to output from 1961 to the 1970’s,
followed by increases. While the short run eﬀect of budget deﬁcits on the interest
rate are well known, this paper focuses on the ratio of national debt to output in
balanced growth and its eﬀects on both the real interest rate and the real wage
rate. In the model that will be developed, balanced growth of a greater national
debt absorbs more savings, reducing the ratio of jobs to employment and raising
the ratio of unemployed to vacancies at each interest rate. In balanced growth
equilibrium, greater national debt then yields a higher ratio of unemployed to
vacancies, a higher real interest rate and a lower real wage rate.
The model developed here is referred to as the Kaldor matching model to
distinguish it from the original Kaldor model with unequal saving rates. There
a r et h r e ef o r m so fi n c o m e :l a b o ri n c o m ef r o mw a g e s( p l u st r a n s f e r sf r o mt h eg o v -
ernment), entrepreneurial income, and interest from either ownership of capital
needed for production or ownership of national debt. Workers meet entrepreneurs
with jobs in a labor market with frictions, with the number of matches per pe-
riod determined by a matching function. Section 2 develops two conditions for
microeconomic equilibrium. The ﬁrst, the Equilibrium Selection Condition, arises
from individuals in the labor force choosing between being workers or being en-
trepreneurs oﬀering jobs to workers. The second, the Entrepreneur Optimization
Condition, arises from competitive wage determination by wage-posting entre-
preneurs. Together, the Equilibrium Selection and Entrepreneur Optimization
Conditions determine the microeconomic relationship between the real interest
rate and the ratio of unemployed to vacancies. Section 3 develops the macroeco-
nomic relationship between the the same two variables, arising from the condition
that Aggregate Supply equal Aggregate Demand. Section 4 shows how micro-
economic and macroeconomic equilibrium determine the ratio of unemployed to
vacancies, the real interest rate and the real wage rate. The section also describes
the adjustment process that moves the economy to balanced growth equilibrium.
Section 5 considers whether macroeconomic policies (national debt per employed
worker or the tax rate on interest income) can aﬀect the real wage rate and derives
6the eﬀects of those policies. The major conclusion is that an increase in national
debt per employed worker lowers the real wage. Section 6 discusses the eﬀects on
factor prices of microeconomic policy variables (taxes on labor and entrepreneur-
ial income and unemployment beneﬁts). Section 7 considers whether the model
provides an explanation for observed real wage declines, compares the model to
the original Kaldor model, and considers extensions.
2. Microeconomic Equilibrium
2.1. Production
Production at the rate of p per period arises from a ﬁxed proportions production
function when a worker is matched with a job oﬀered by an entrepreneur. Tech-
nological change is assumed to be absent. The job requires k units of capital.
T h ec a p i t a ld e p r e c i a t e sa tt h er a t eδ when production is taking place so that the
entrepreneur must replace capital at the rate δk as production occurs. Matches
break up at a rate of γ per period, the same for all matches. Matches are formed
at a rate determined by a matching function M(U,V ), where U is the number of
unemployed and V is the number of vacancies in the labor market (see Christo-
pher Pissarides, 2000, pp. 6-7, and Barbara Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001, for
discussions of the matching function and Eran Yashiv, 2000, for estimations). The
matching function is assumed to have constant returns to scale in U and V, be
an increasing, concave function of its arguments, and equal zero if either U or V
is zero. As a result of the assumption of constant returns to scale, the rate of
formation of matches per vacancy is M(U,V )/V = M(U/V,1). Let θ = U/V and
let m(θ)=M(θ,1). T h e nt h er a t ea tw h i c hu n e m p l o y e dw o r k e r sg e tm a t c h e si s
M(U,V )/U = m(θ)/θ.
Let L be the total number of individuals in the labor market, either as workers
or as entrepreneurs. Let J be the number of jobs and let E be the number
of current matches between workers and jobs. Assume each entrepreneur can
manage NJ jobs. With these assumptions,
U = L − E − J/NJ (2.1)
V = J − E






(L − E − J/NJ)+γE + ρL − ρJ/NJ (2.2)
= ρ(L − E − J/NJ)
dV
dt
= −m(θ)(J − E)+γE + ρJ = ρ(J − E)
The conditions require that unemployment and vacancies grow at the balanced
growth rate of ρ. In the ﬁrst line, unemployment declines by the match rate for
unemployed workers times the number of unemployed and increases by the rate
of match break-ups and balanced growth additions to the labor force seeking
employment. This rate of change equals the growth rate times the number of
unemployed. In the second line, vacancies decline by the match rate for vacancies
times the number of vacancies and increases by the rate of match break-ups and
balanced growth increase in jobs. This rate of change equals the growth rate times
the number of vacancies. In a balanced growth equilibrium, the unemployment
and vacancy rates depend on the rate of growth of the economy, ρ, since new
workers enter as unemployed and new jobs enter as vacancies. Solving 2.2 for J
and E in a balanced growth equilibrium yields:
E =
m(θ)NJL
(1 + θNJ)(γ + ρ)+( 1+NJ)m(θ)
(2.3)
J =
(γ + ρ + m(θ))NJL
(1 + θNJ)(γ + ρ)+( 1+NJ)m(θ)
2.2. Workers
Workers move back and forth between employment and unemployment according
to a two-state Markov process with transition rates m(θ)/θ and γ. Let WU and
WE be the asset values for an unemployed and an employed worker, respectively.
These are the expected present discounted values of future beneﬁts of working
and unemployment.3 The asset values are derived in the standard way as in Peter
Diamond (1982). The asset values satisfy
βWU =( 1 − tw)b +( m(θ)/θ)(WE − WU) (2.4)
βWE =( 1 − tw)w + γ(WU − WE)
3The asset values, added to current assets, approximate the value functions from an optimal
control problem in which workers save. The error from the approximation appears to be small
(Sattinger, 2003).
8where β is the discount rate, b is the level of unemployment beneﬁts, tw is the tax
rate for wages and unemployment beneﬁts, and w i st h ew a g er a t e .T h ed i s c o u n t
rate is assumed to be the same for all workers and entrepreneurs and diﬀers from




γ + β + m(θ)/θ
(1 − tw)b +
m(θ)/θ
γ + β + m(θ)/θ
(1 − tw)w (2.5)
The ﬂow of asset value βWU is therefore a weighted average of the beneﬁts while
unemployed and employed, with the weights diﬀering from the unemployment
and employment rates because employment is discounted from the future for an
unemployed worker (Sattinger, 1985, pp. 11-12).
2.3. Entrepreneurs and Jobs
Jobs move between being vacant and being ﬁl l e da c c o r d i n gt oat w o - s t a t eM a r k o v
process with transition rates m(θ) and γ. Let WV and WF be the asset values for
a vacant and ﬁlled job, respectively. The asset values satisfy
βWV = −(1 − tp)rk + m(θ)(WF − WV) (2.6)
βWF =( 1 − tp)(p − w − δk − rk)+γ(WV − WF)
where r is the interest rate in the economy and tp is the tax rate on entrepreneurial
proﬁts. The entrepreneur pays interest on the capital k when the job is vacant
but receives a tax beneﬁt from the loss. When ﬁlled, a job generates entrepre-
neurial proﬁts at a rate equal to the rate of production p, minus the wage rate w,
minus depreciation δk, minus interest payments rk. As a minimum requirement
for matches to occur, output is assumed to cover depreciation, interest payments,
and the minimum wage necessary to exceed unemployment beneﬁts:
p − δk − rk − b ≥ 0 (2.7)
T h es y s t e mi n2 . 6c a nb es o l v e df o rt h eﬂow of asset value βWV:
βWV =
m(θ)
γ + β + m(θ)
(1 − tp)(p − w − δk) − (1 − tp)rk (2.8)
2.4. Supply of Workers and Entrepreneurs
Individuals in the labor market are assumed to choose between being workers or
entrepreneurs. Individuals choosing to be entrepreneurs can supervise NJ jobs
9each. Their choice is based on whether the asset value from starting as an en-
trepreneur, WVNJ, exceeds the asset value from starting as a worker, WU. The
condition for individuals’ equilibrium selection between being workers or entre-
preneurs is that they should be indiﬀerent between the two activities:
WU = WVNJ (2.9)
This will be referred to as the Equilibrium Selection Condition. This condition
c a nb es o l v e df o rt h ew a g er a t ea tw h i c hi ti ss a t i s ﬁed:
w =







(γ + β)θ + m(θ)
γ + β + m(θ)
(2.11)
The number of individuals in the labor market, either as workers or entrepre-
neurs, is assumed to be an increasing function of the ﬂow of asset value βWU. By
2.9, this is the same value whether a person is seeking employment as a worker or




where H is a monotonically increasing function, ρ i st h er a t eo fg r o w t ho ft h e
population, and t is time. (The speciﬁc form of the labor supply function in 2.12
plays no role in the determination of the equilibrium values of θ, w and r, as
will be seen in following sections.) For a constant value of βWU, the number of
individuals in the labor market will grow at the rate ρ per period.
2.5. Wage Determination
Wages are assumed to be determined by the mechanism described in Sattinger
(1990), later referred to as wage posting.4 Entrepreneurs announce their wages
prior to a match so that no bargaining occurs. Workers know posted wages and
can direct their search towards an employer oﬀering a greater value. By oﬀering a
higher wage, entrepreneurs can attract a higher number of applicants per period,
thereby lowering the time it takes to ﬁll a vacancy. In response to a higher
4See Adrian M. Masters, 1999, and Daron Acemoglu and Robert Shimer, 1999, for applica-
tions of wage posting.
10wage with an entrepreneur, the number of applicants per period rises until the
value of seeking employment with the entrepreneur equals the value of seeking
employment elsewhere in the labor market. With this adjustment in the number
of applicants as a constraint on the choice of wage, the entrepreneur maximizes
its asset value WV with respect to the wage. In equilibrium, the optimal wage
for an entrepreneur equals the wage prevailing in the market, and the expected
number of applicants per period for an entrepreneur’s vacancy equals the ratio of
unemployed to vacancies in the labor market, θ. The maximization problem of
the entrepreneur ensures that the entrepreneur and worker have the same trade-
oﬀs between the wage, w, and the ratio of unemployed to vacancies, θ.T h i si sa
necessary condition for eﬃciency and eliminates search congestion in the model
developed by Sattinger (1990).
Applying this approach in the Kaldor matching model, the worker’s and entre-
preneur’s marginal rates of substitution between the wage and θ can be derived,
set equal, and solved for the wage. This procedure yields
w =
(γ + β + m(θ))(bm(θ)+θm0(θ)(p − b − δk))
m(θ)(γ + β + m(θ)+( 1− θ)m0(θ))
(2.13)
+
m0(θ)(1 − θ)(p − δk)
γ + β + m(θ)+( 1− θ)m0(θ)
This will be referred to as the Entrepreneur Optimization Condition.
2.6. Microeconomic Relation Between r and θ
The Equilibrium Selection Condition in 2.10 and the Entrepreneur Optimization
Condition in 2.13 yield two relations among the three variables r, θ and w. For a
given interest rate, the two conditions determine the wage rate and θ. Figure 2.1
shows the Entrepreneur Optimization Condition and the Equilibrium Selection
Condition for two alternative interest rates using particular parametric assump-
tions.5 A feature of the Entrepreneur Optimization Condition is that it does not
depend on the interest rate because r does not enter the entrepreneur’s Marginal
Rate of Substitution of wage rate for θ. However, a higher interest rate reduces
WV relative to WU, so that at a given θ t h ew a g er a t em u s tb el o w e rf o rt h eE q u i -
librium Selection Condition to hold. Thus the Equilibrium Selection Condition is
shifted downward for a higher interest rate. Since the Entrepreneur Optimization
5The ﬁgure assumes m(θ)=θ/(1 + θ),p=1 ,k=1 0 ,ρ= .04,β= .02,γ= .02,N J =4 ,
δ = .01,t w = tp = tr = .1,b= .05 and D/E = .2.
11Condition stays ﬁxed, the Equilibrium Selection and Entrepreneur Optimization
Conditions generate an upward sloping relation between r and θ. This result is
summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1. In the Kaldor matching model, comparing balanced growth mi-
croeconomic equilibria satisfying the Equilibrium Selection and Entrepreneur Op-
timization Conditions, the interest rate is an increasing function of the ratio of
unemployed to vacancies.
This relation can be found analytically be setting the right hand side of 2.10
(the wage rate from the Equilibrium Selection Condition) equal to the right hand
side of 2.13 (the wage rate from the Entrepreneur Optimization Condition) and
solving for r in terms of θ. It is given by
r =
(p − δk − b)(NJ(1 − tp)(m(θ) − θm0(θ)) − (1 − tw)m0(θ))





In Section 4, this microeconomic relation will be combined with the Macroeco-
nomic Condition for Equilibrium to determine both r and θ in balanced growth
equilibrium.
An important assumption in the original Kaldor model is that the capital to
output ratio is ﬁxed so that in the absence of a marginal product of capital, the
proﬁt share is determined at a level that yields the required saving rate. With the
ﬁxed proportion production function assumed in the Kaldor matching model, the
marginal product of capital in an individual match is also undeﬁned. However,
in the aggregate economy, the addition of a job (requiring a ﬁxed amount of
capital) increases the balanced growth level of employment and therefore has a
well-deﬁned marginal contribution to production. The use of a matching model
in this paper does not have as its purpose the elimination of marginal products
of factors. Instead, the matching technology is used because vacancies are well-
deﬁned (in the sense of a vacant job) and the description and determination of
equilibrium arise conveniently in terms of the ratio of unemployed to vacancies.
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Equilibrium Selection, r = .02
Equilibrium Selection, r = .04
Figure 2.1: Entrepreneur Optimization and Equilibrium Selection Conditions
3. Macroeconomic Equilibrium
3.1. Government
The government taxes labor income, entrepreneurial income and interest income at
potentially diﬀerent tax rates, pays interest at the rate r on the national debt, pays
unemployment compensation, expands the national debt at the balanced growth
rate ρ, p e r h a p sr u n sad e ﬁcit or surplus beyond the balanced growth expansion,
and distributes the residual in the form of transfers to individuals in the economy.
The government’s budget constraint can therefore be expressed as
T + ρD = rD + B + R + bU (3.1)
where T is the amount of taxes collected, D is the national debt, B is the budget
deﬁcit or surplus net of balanced growth changes, R is the level of transfers,
and bU is the amount paid out in unemployment beneﬁts. In a balanced growth
equilibrium, B =0 .
Labor income consists of wages, Ew, plus transfers, R, plus unemployment
beneﬁts, bU, which are all taxed at the same rate tw. Entrepreneurial income is
E(p − w − δk) − Jrk, which is output net of wages and depreciation for ﬁlled
jobs minus the interest cost of capital incurred for jobs. Entrepreneurial income
13is taxed at the rate tp. Interest income is given by Jrk+ rD and is taxed at the
rate tr. Total taxes in the economy are given by
T = tw(Ew+ R + bU)+tp(E(p − w − δk) − Jrk)+tr(Jrk+ rD) (3.2)
Rearranging 3.1 assuming B =0yields
R = T +( ρ − r)D − bU (3.3)





E(w(tw − tp)+ptp − δk) − (1 − tw)bU
+Jrk(tr − tp)+D(ρ − r(1 − tr))
¶
(3.4)
When this expression is used for R in Aggregate Demand, the government budget
constraint is automatically satisﬁed.
3.2. Aggregate Demand
Income Y is the sum of labor, entrepreneurial and interest income:
Y = Ew+ bU + R + E(p − w − δk) − Jrk+ Jrk+ rD (3.5)
Assume that the saving rate out of after-tax income is a function s(r) of the
interest rate r. T h es a v i n gr a t ei sa s s u m e dt ob et h es a m ef o ra l ll e v e l so fi n c o m e
and all types of income, unlike Kaldor’s original model. Aggregate Demand, AD,
is then the proportion of after-tax income that is not saved, (1 − s(r))(Y − T),
plus depreciation, Eδk, plus investment needed for balanced growth, ρJk :
AD =( 1− s(r))(Y − T)+Eδk+ ρJk (3.6)
Substituting Y from 3.5, T from 3.2, and R from 3.4 yields:
AD = E((1 − s(r))p + s(r)δk)+ρ(1 − s(r))D + ρJk (3.7)
3.3. Conditions for Macroeconomic Equilibrium
Aggregate Supply minus Aggregate Demand can be found by subtracting AD
from Ep :
AS − AD = Es(r)(p − δk) − ρD(1 − s(r)) − ρJk (3.8)
14The notable feature of this expression for AS −AD is that tax and transfer vari-
ables b, tw,t p and tr do not directly appear. This occurs because transfers R are
the residual of government revenues net of unemployment beneﬁts and the saving
rate s(r) is the same for all income types. The tax and transfer variables then re-
distribute production among income types, all of which have the same saving rate,
without aﬀecting the diﬀerence between aggregate supply and aggregate demand.
The variables may aﬀect WU and L, but E, J and D will all be proportional to
L in balanced growth, so that E, J and D are suﬃcient to determine AS − AD.
Interest rate payments for capital and on national debt also drop out of 3.8 for
the same reasons, but the interest rate enters through its eﬀect on the savings
rate, s(r).
In macroeconomic equilibrium, Aggregate Supply equals Aggregate Demand,
so AS − AD =0 . This condition can also be viewed as stating that in balanced
growth macroeconomic equilibrium, national savings, Es(r)(p−δk)−ρD(1−s(r)),
equals investment, ρJk. Setting AS −AD equal to zero and dividing by E yields












Equality between AS and AD determines J/E (given the savings rate s(r)) be-
cause national savings (for a given ratio of national debt to employment) depends
on E while investment in balanced growth depends on J. The ratio J/E must
exceed one for vacancies to be positive. For this to occur in a balanced growth










Now consider the relation between the ratio of jobs to employment and the








Since m(θ) is an increasing function of θ,t h er a t i oo fj o b st oe m p l o y m e n t ,J/E,
is a decreasing function of θ. Combining 3.9 and 3.11 yields the condition for




s(r)(p − δk) − ρ(1 − s(r))D/E − ρk
(γ + ρ)ρk
(3.12)
15The condition for Macroeconomic Equilibrium yields a relationship between the
ratio of unemployed to vacancies, θ, and the saving rate. Regarding the saving
rate as a function of the interest rate, the condition yields a relationship between
θ and r. Features of this relationship are provided in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. In the Kaldor matching model, with the national debt constraint
holding, balanced growth macroeconomic equilibrium determines the ratio of un-
employed to vacancies as a decreasing function of the saving rate in 3.12. If the
saving rate is an increasing function of the interest rate, the interest rate will be
a decreasing function of the ratio of unemployed to vacancies. For a given saving
rate, θ is greater for greater values of ρ, δ, k, and D/E and smaller for greater
values of p.
Proof. From 3.9, an increase in s(r) raises J/E and from 3.11, a higher value
of J/E yields a lower value of θ. If s0(r) > 0, a higher interest rate raises the
saving rate, reducing θ. From 3.9, higher values of δ, k and D/E and lower values
of p yield lower ratios J/E and higher values of θ. By diﬀerentiation of 3.12, a
higher growth rate ρ yields a higher ratio θ, and a higher separation rate γ also
yields a higher θ, completing the proof.
3.4. The Saving Rate
In this section, a relation between savings and the interest rate is speciﬁed that is
consistent with intertemporal optimization. Although the Kaldor matching model
can be worked out for an arbitrary savings function s(r), a relation consistent with
intertemporal optimization will demonstrate that the results are not generated by
departures from optimizing behavior.
Consider an individual with time-separable instantaneous utility of consump-
tion given by the logarithm of consumption. Suppose the individual has a discount
rate β and receives an after-tax return on assets of (1 − tr)r. Then the solution
to the individual’s inﬁnite horizon continuous time optimal control consumption-
saving problem is to set consumption at each instant equal to β/((1−tr)r) times





With the saving rate given by 3.13, the macroeconomic relation between the












Figure 4.1: Balanced Growth Equilibrium
interest rate and the ratio of unemployed to vacancies is given by:
r =
β(p − δk + ρD/E)m(θ)
(1 − tr)((p − δk + ρk)m(θ) − ρk(γ + ρ))
(3.14)
The eﬀects of macroeconomic policies on factor prices are sensitive to assumptions
regarding the saving rate. Alternatives will be considered in Section 5.1.
4. Balanced Growth Equilibrium
Determination of the economy’s balanced growth equilibrium from the separate
Microeconomic and Macroeconomic Conditions is shown in Figure 4.1, which uses
the same assumptions as for Figure 2.1.6 In Figure 4.1, the combinations of r
and θ lying on the upward-sloping Microeconomic Equilibrium curve yield the
equal wages from the Equilibrium Selection and Entrepreneur Optimization Con-
ditions. Combinations of r and θ lying on the downward-sloping Macroeconomic
Equilibrium curve satisfy 2.14 and yield equality between Aggregate Supply and
Aggregate Demand.
6The equilibrium ratio of unemployed to vacancies is 1.39 and the equilibrium interest rate
is .044.
17A combination of r and θ satisfying both the Microeconomic and Macroeco-
nomic Conditions is unique since the microeconomic relation is upward sloping
(from Theorem 2.1) and the macroeconomic relation is downward sloping (from
Theorem 3.1). Existence depends on parameter values and arises if the inter-
est rate from the microeconomic relation starts below the interest rate from the
macroeconomic relation (at low levels of θ) and then goes above the interest rate
from the macroeconomic relation as θ increases.
It is routine to work out comparative static eﬀects of parameter changes
through their eﬀects on the microeconomic or macroeconomic relations. Of par-
ticular interest is the result that a higher growth rate ρ shifts the macroeconomic
relation to the right, raising r and θ. If the macroeconomic relation is relatively
ﬂat, as shown in Figure 4.1, the eﬀects will be moderate.
Although dynamics will be deferred to a later paper, the mechanisms that
bring the economy to the balanced growth equilibrium illustrated in Figure 4.1
can be brieﬂy described. Microeconomic adjustment of θ for a given r is shown
in Figure 4.2 using the same assumptions as Figures 2.1 and 4.1. The upward
sloping line shows combinations of asset values WU and WV that satisfy the Equi-
librium Selection Condition. The condition implies that the slope is NJ since
WU = WVNJ. The downward sloping curve labeled Entrepreneur Optimization
Condition shows combinations of WU and WV generated by varying θ, with the
wage determined by the Entrepreneur Optimization Condition in 2.13 and the
interest rate ﬁxed at the equilibrium level, r = .044. A higher ratio of unem-
ployed to vacancies beneﬁts entrepreneurs and harms workers, so the curve slopes
downward with higher values of θ yielding combinations further to the right. At
θ1,W U >W VNJ, leading entrepreneurs to switch to being workers and raising θ.
This moves the ratio θ in the direction of the value satisfying both the Entrepre-
neur Optimization and Equilibrium Selection Conditions, at E. Analogously at
θ2,W U <W VNJ and θ decreases towards the equilibrium value at E.
Macroeconomic adjustment of the interest rate occurs through a loanable funds
mechanism as shown in Figure 4.3, which uses the same assumptions as Figures
2.1 and 4.1. For a given θ, investment per worker is determined as ρkJ/E, an
amount independent of the interest rate. Investment then appears as a verticle
line in Figure 4.3. National savings per worker, s(r)(p−δk)−ρ(1−s(r))D/E, is
the upward sloping curve in the ﬁgure. Investment and national savings depend
on θ, but θ is taken as given in the macroeconomic adjustment process. At a
low interest rate, r1, investment exceeds national savings and the interest rate
rises towards the level consistent with macroeconomic equilibrium, at E. At a














Figure 4.2: Microeconomic Adjustment of Unemployed to Vacancy Ratio
high interest rate, national savings exceeds investment and the interest rate falls
towards E.
With these mechanisms, both θ and r adjust towards levels satisfying condi-
tions for microeconomic and macroeconomic equilibrium in balanced growth.
5. Macroeconomic Policy
5.1. Can Macroeconomic Policies Aﬀect Real Wages?
Prior to deriving the eﬀects of macroeconomic policies on wages and the interest
rate, this section considers whether there are alternative assumptions or phe-
nomena that would rule out such cross eﬀects, creating a dichotomy between
microeconomic and macroeconomic policies.
5.1.1. Ricardian Equivalence
Macroeconomic and microeconomic equilibrium interact only through the ratio of
unemployed to vacancies and the interest rate, via its eﬀect on the saving rate.
Microeconomic policy variables tw,t p and b drop out of the expression for macro-
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Figure 4.3: Macroeconomic Adjustment of Interest Rate
economic equilibrium in 3.12; macroeconomic policy variables D/E and tr do not
appear in the expressions for microeconomic equilibrium in 2.14. Macroeconomic
policy variables therefore do not shift the microeconomic equilibrium curve in
Figure 4.1, and microeconomic policy variables do not shift the macroeconomic
equilibrium curve.
However, wages and interest rates are aﬀected if macroeconomic policies shift
the macroeconomic equilibrium curve. A shift in the macroeconomic equilibrium
curve will not occur if savings are perfectly elastic at a ﬁxed interest rate or if the
savings function changes in a way that exactly compensates for the macroeconomic
policy change, insulating the microeconomic sector from macroeconomic policy
variables. To consider the latter case, rearrange 3.9 to yield the saving rate at
which AD equals AS :
s(r)=
ρkJ/E + ρD/E
p − δk + ρD/E
(5.1)
Since the numerator in 5.1 is smaller, an increase in D/E requires a higher saving
rate. If the saving function shifts in response to higher D/E so that the greater
saving rate occurs at the former interest rate, then the macroeconomic equilibrium
curve will not shift, and wages and interest rates will be unaﬀected by D/E.
20One mechanism that could conceivably provide such a shift in the personal
savings function, insulating factor prices from macroeconomic policies, is Ricar-
dian Equivalence, which occurs when consumers disregard current tax cuts by
recognizing that future tax obligations are increased. By extension, an increase
in transfers generated by greater national debt would be disregarded if consumers
expect taxes to increase in the future. However, only balanced growth equilib-
ria are being compared in the Kaldor matching model. In an equilibrium with a
higher debt to employment ratio, taxes will not be raised over time to pay for the
greater debt. Ricardian Equivalence therefore provides no basis for a shift in the
savings function that leaves the macroeconomic equilibrium curve unchanged.7
5.1.2. Policy Rule
A second mechanism is a policy rule to adjust the tax rate on interest income, tr,
in response to changes in the national debt to employment ratio, D/E. Setting
the saving rate in 5.1 equal to the right hand side of 3.13 and solving for tr yields
tr =1−
b(p − δk + ρD/E)
r(p − δk + ρkJ/E)
(5.2)
If the tax rate on interest income is set according to the rule in 5.2 (holding r
ﬁxed), then a change in D/E yields no change in the interest rate at each ratio θ,
so that the macroeconomic equilibrium curve does not shift.
5.1.3. Constant Saving Rate
In Kaldor’s original model, the saving rates for diﬀerent types of income were
unequal but constant. If the saving rate does not depend on the interest rate,
macroeconomic equilibrium would determine the ratio of unemployed to vacancies,
and the microeconomic conditions then would determine the real wage and real
interest rate. An increase in national debt would require a lower ratio of jobs to
employment and a higher ratio of unemployed to vacancies. The macroeconomic
equilibrium curve would be a vertical line and would shift right when national debt
increased. Macroeconomic policies would then continue to aﬀect factor prices.
7This conclusion is limited to comparisons among balanced growth equilibria. In response
to business cycles or movement from one equilibrium to another, Ricardian Equivalence could
apply.
215.1.4. Savings Determined by Bequests
Assuming growth in the population and labor force arises from the progeny of the
current population, a bequest motive could lead wealth owners to transfer wealth
to progeny. If wealth owners transfer amounts that leave new individuals with the
same amounts as the owners, the total amount transferred would be ρD + ρJk.
Suppose this bequest motive is the only reason for saving and that the ratio of






National savings would be
sb(E(p − δk)+ρD) − ρD = ρJk (5.4)
so national savings would equal investment for all values of D/E. Real wage and
interest rates would be determined by microeconomic equilibrium, unaﬀected by
D/E or tr. The tax on interest income would fall completely on interest recipients.
5.1.5. Bequests Combined with Optimal Savings
T h es a v i n gr a t ec o n s i d e r e di n5 . 3r e q u i r es that new members of the population
receive wealth equal to current members, that wealth be distributed in exact
proportion to income, and that the saving rate depend only on the ratio of bequests
to income and not on the interest rate. A less restrictive alternative is to suppose
that savings arise from optimal saving out of after-tax income net of bequests.
This assumption does not require that wealth be proportional to income for all
individuals. With bequests equal to ρD + ρJk, national savings would be







(E(p − δk)+ρD − (ρD + ρJk)) + (ρD + ρJk) − ρD
Then national savings would not depend on national debt, and national savings
would equal investment when s(r)=0 . Az e r os a v i n gr a t eo c c u r sw h e nr(1−tr)=
β. With this savings behavior, the real wage and interest rates are unaﬀected by
D/E. The after-tax interest rate would always equal the discount rate β, so both
the real wage and interest rates would still depend on tr.
225.1.6. Capital Proportional to Employment
In the model developed here, entrepreneurs pay interest on the capital for a job
whether the job is ﬁlled or vacant. As an alternative, it could be assumed that
entrepreneurs only need capital when a job is ﬁlled.8 Balanced growth then re-
quires investment of ρEk instead of ρJk, so that macroeconomic equilibrium is
unaﬀected by the ratio of unemployed to vacancies, θ. The condition for Aggregate
Demand equal to Aggregate Supply becomes
s(r)(p − δk + ρD/E) − ρD/E = ρk (5.6)
This condition determines the interest rate, which then determines the wage rate
and θ in microeconomic equilibrium. In Figure 4.1, the curve for macroeconomic
equilibrium would be a horizontal line at the interest rate determined by 5.6. A
change in the ratio of national debt to employment, D/E, will continue to aﬀect
the real wage through its eﬀect on the interest rate.
In summary, wage and interest rates will be unaﬀected by macroeconomic
policy (either national debt or the tax rate on interest income) if the saving rate
is determined entirely by the bequest motive or if the government follows the
policy rule in 5.2, setting a lower tax on interest income if national debt is higher.
If savings were determined by the optimal saving rate out of after-tax income net
of bequests, the real wage would be unaﬀected by the ratio of national debt to
employment but would continue to be aﬀected by the tax rate on interest income.
5.2. National Debt
Now consider the eﬀects of the ratio of national debt to employment, D/E, on
wage and interest rates when the saving rate is determined by s(r) in 3.13 (or
some other upward sloping function of the interest rate) and the tax on interest
income is held ﬁxed. From 3.8,
AS − AD
E
= s(r)(p − δk) − ρ(1 − s(r))D/E − ρkJ/E (5.7)
Ah i g h e rv a l u eo fD/E reduces national savings, yielding AS < AD at the former
values of r, s(r) and J/E. In Figure 4.2, the curve for national savings shifts left.
Then the interest rate rises, raising the saving rate and lowering AD at each ratio
8Pissarides (2000, pp. 23-26) uses this assumption to incorporate capital into a matching
model of unemployment.
23θ. Thus the curve for macroeconomic equilibrium in Figure 4.1 is higher for higher
values of D/E. Combined with the microeconomic equilibrium curve, the higher
macroeconomic equilibrium curve yields a higher ratio θ and a higher interest rate.
From Figure 2.1 (or 2.13 and 2.10), the higher interest rate and higher θ yield a
lower wage rate.
5.3. Tax on Interest Income
A positive tax on interest income, tr, reduces the net interest rate available to
savers. A higher tax on interest income therefore reduces the saving rate at each
interest rate. At each θ, macroeconomic equilibrium occurs at a higher interest
rate. In Figure 4.2, national savings shifts upward when tr is higher. In Figure 4.1,
the macroeconomic equilibrium curve is higher when tr is higher. Then θ and r
are higher, and the wage rate satisfying the Entrepreneur Optimization Condition
and Equilibrium Selection Condition must be lower.
These results are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose the saving rate is an increasing function of the interest
rate and the tax on interest income is not given by the policy rule in 5.2. In
the Kaldor matching model, comparing alternative balanced growth equilibria,
a higher ratio of national debt to employment, D/E, or a higher tax on interest
income, tr, yields a higher ratio of unemployed to vacancies, a higher interest rate,
and a lower wage rate.
Figure 5.1 shows the eﬀects of national debt on the wage rate, using the saving
rate in 3.13 and other particular assumptions.
5.4. Eﬀects on Asset Values
The eﬀects of macroeconomic policy variables on the asset values WU and WV can
be determined from the results of Theorem 5.1. The asset value for unemployed
workers, WU, unambiguously decreases from an increase in D/E or increase in tr
since the increase in θ and decrease in w both reduce WU in 2.5 and the interest rate
r does not appear in that expression. Since WU = WVNJ from the Equilibrium
Selection Condition, the asset values WU and WV must move together. Thus WV
also decreases, despite the decrease in the wage rate and increase in θ. Further,
since WU declines when D/E or tr go up, the labor force L(WU) will also decrease,
reducing the level of economic activity.











Figure 5.1: National Debt and Wage Rate
6. Microeconomic Policy
The eﬀects of microeconomic policies tw, tp and b can also be determined using the
Kaldor matching model. All three policy variables enter the Equilibrium Selection
Condition, but only b enters the Entrepreneur Optimization Condition.
6.1. Taxes on Labor and Entrepreneurial Income
Ah i g h e rtw or lower tp yields a higher Φ in 2.11. Then in the Equilibrium Se-
lection Condition in 2.10, a higher Φ r a i s e st h ew a g er a t ea tag i v e nθ, since the
numerator increases relatively more than the denominator. At a given θ, the wage
rate generated by the Equilibrium Selection Condition exceeds the wage rate gen-
erated by the Entrepreneur Optimization Condition at the original interest rate.
Ar e d u c t i o ni nθ brings the two wage rates into equality. Alternatively, in Figure
4.2, the increase in tw or reduction in tp raises the asset value of an entrepreneur
with a vacancy relative to the asset value of an unemployed worker, shifting the
Entrepreneur Optimization Condition curve downward and requiring an increase
in θ for the given interest rate. The microeconomic equilibrium curve is therefore
higher when tw is higher or tp is lower. From the balanced growth equilibrium
25shown in Figure 4.1, the interest rate r will be higher and θ will be lower. Then
from the Entrepreneur Optimization Condition, the wage must be higher. Note
that if 1−tp and 1−tw change by the same proportion, Φ remains the same and
there are no eﬀects on θ, r or w.
6.2. Unemployment Beneﬁts
The eﬀects of unemployment beneﬁts, b, can be analyzed in terms of the curves
for the Equilibrium Selection and Entrepreneur Optimization Conditions in Figure
2.1. In the Equilibrium Selection Condition in 2.10, an increase in unemployment
beneﬁt b reduces the wage at a given θ. In the Entrepreneur Optimization Condi-
tion in 2.13, the coeﬃcient of b in the numerator is m(θ)−θm0(θ). This is positive
from the assumptions regarding the matching function.9 Then at the former val-
ues of θ and r, the wage rate from the Entrepreneur Optimization Condition will
exceed the wage rate from the Equilibrium Selection Condition, requiring an in-
crease in θ to bring about microeconomic equilibrium at the given interest rate.
The microeconomic equilibrium curve shown in Figure 4.1 therefore shifts to the
right. In balanced growth equilibrium, a higher b yields a higher θ, lower interest
rate r and a lower wage rate (from the Entrepreneur Optimization Condition),
everything else the same.
These results for microeconomic policy variables are summarized in the fol-
lowing theorem.
Theorem 6.1. In the Kaldor matching model, comparing alternative balanced
growth equilibria, a higher tax on labor income, lower tax on entrepreneurial
income or higher unemployment beneﬁt will yield a lower ratio of unemployed to
vacancies, higher interest rate and higher wage rate.
7. Conclusions
This paper has focused on the eﬀects of macroeconomic policy on the real wage
and interest rates, justifying Tinbergen’s inclusion of the real wage rate as a target
9The matching function is assumed to be homogeneous of degree one with positive derivatives
when θ is positive and ﬁnite. Then M(θ,1) = θM1(θ,1) + M2(θ,1) and
m(θ) − θm0(θ)=M(θ,1) − θM1(θ,1) = M2(θ,1) > 0
26variable. In the area of income distribution, the major conclusion of this paper is
that the real wage and interest rate are not uniquely determined by microeconomic
competitive conditions and instead can be aﬀected by macroeconomic policies.
The eﬀect of national debt on the real wage is fairly general, as long as the saving
rate is not determined by the bequest motive and the tax on interest income
does not follow the insulating policy rule in 5.2. Comparing alternative balanced
growth equilibria, a higher ratio of national debt to employment generates a higher
real interest rate, a higher ratio of unemployed to vacancies, and a lower real wage
rate. This result can explain the general patterns of the data in Table 1. When
the debt to output ratio is relatively high (in the beginning and last parts of the
period), the real interest rate is higher and the real wage rate is lower than in the
m i d d l ep e r i o d ,w h e nt h ed e b tt oe m p l o y m e n tr a t i oi sr e l a t i v e l yl o w . E m p i r i c a l
testing of the eﬀect of national debt will require disentangling the balanced growth
relationships from short run open economy macroeconomic adjustments and shifts
in savings behavior.
James Tobin (1989, p. 38) expressed three reservations concerning the original
Kaldor model. The ﬁrst concerned whether factor prices could be determined
independently of their productivities. In the Kaldor matching model developed
here, factor prices are not independent of their productivities, but also are not
uniquely determined by them. For a given ratio of unemployed to vacancies,
competitive behavior of workers and entrepreneurs, reﬂected in the Equilibrium
Selection Condition and Entrepreneur Optimization Condition, determine factor
prices consistent with optimizing behavior. Diﬀerent values of θ, brought about by
shifts in the macroeconomic equilibrium curve, then yield diﬀerent real wages and
real interest rates, as shown in the curve for microeconomic equilibrium. Tobin’s
second reservation was that the consumption function could not explain both
income shares and level of output. In the Kaldor matching model, other relations
(generated by the Equilibrium Selection Condition, Entrepreneur Optimization
Condition and Aggregate Supply equal to Aggregate Demand) are combined with
the consumption function (expressed in terms of the saving rate s(r))t od e t e r m i n e
income shares and level of output in balanced growth equilibrium. While the
consumption function plays a role, it is not being overburdened. Tobin’s third
reservation was that investment was wholly exogenous in Kaldor’s original model.
In the Kaldor matching model, both national savings and national investment
are endogenous. National investment can vary depending on the ratio of jobs
to employment. National savings can vary depending on the amount of savings
absorbed by balanced growth expansion of the national debt.
27This paper has only explored balanced growth links between macroeconomics
and factor prices. Important extensions would explore eﬃcient public ﬁnance and
the relation between short-run changes in income distribution and macroeconomic
adjustment.
Previous analyses of Kaldor’s original model focused on diﬀerential saving
rates, growth factors, and the absence of marginal products as the source of the
results. This paper instead emphasizes the condition imposed on competitive
factor price determination by macroeconomic equilibrium.
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